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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
GooDYEAR TIRE AND R-UBBER CoMPANY, a corporation, and HARTFORD AcciDENT AND INDEMNITY
CoMPANY, a corporati~on,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 6250

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL CoMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH and LEE
JAMES HARRIS,

Defenda;nts.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF

J

Counsel for defendants w·ould have it appear that
paintiffs are attacking in thi~s court the findings made hy
the Industrial Commission. Not only is such not our
position, but we desire it ;clearly understood at the outset of this brief that pla.intif:f:is ~do not question the established rule referred to by defendants that if there is
substantial and compe'tent evidence to support the findings of the :Co:rnmi.ssion, that the .court will not disturb
such findings. It logically follows, therefore, that the
ea~se's ei ted and discussed by defendants to this effect
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are beside the issue in this cas-e. .Si~mply stated, the
issue is: Under the material undisp.uted facts of this
oase, was the Industrial c·ommiiS'Sion justified in concluding as a matter of la,w from such facts that the applicant
was injured in an accident artising out of or in the course
of his e-mployn1ent ~
It is of ·course obvious that the ruling of the Industri~al Commission that the accident to the applicant o~
curred while in the eourise of his em~ployment is not a
finding of fact but a conclusion of law from the facts,
which conclusion we submit is contrary to law he-cause
not warranted by the facts. The only finding in the de·cision of the Industrial ·Commission as to how the accident occurred is the foHowing:
''Being required to work overtime, the applicant rode a m·otor cycle owned by the Goodyear
Tire & Rubber C·ompany to his hom·e for dinner,
and was accidentally injured on the return trip,
the motor cycle bec,ame unmanageable, left the
road, and crashed into the side of a private
residence.''
What the connection is between being required to
work overtim·e and riding a motor cycle to his ·home to
get dinner does not a~ppea.r, be1cause it obviously is the
fact that he was .injured not while working overtime and
doing somHthing for his employer, but while on an errand
of his own.
There is therefore no dispute as to wher-e the applicant was or what he was d)oing ~a.t the tim-e of ~h:e
a:ccident.
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Plaintiffs do not complain of any finding of fa·ct
made by the Comnrission, hut do say .most emphatirally
that the con·clusion of law drawn by the Commission
from such findings of fa·ct is eontra.ry to law and is not
warranted by the evidence.
C-ouns-el for defendants, in a.n effort to show that
the applicant \Yas con1sidered by the employer to be on
the payroll "up to the very ins'tant of the injury,'' c.alls
attention to what is attached to a letter (Item 7 of the
record) and states, "This time sheet . . . apparently
shows that $·3.28 is due applicant for ten and one-half
hours-from '5-7 to 5-13-39','' and then follows this with
the statement that '·'P'resumably the ten and one-half
hours is for the regular shift up to six-thirty o 'clo:ck
and two and one-half hours overtime thereafter on May
8, 193-9." Examination .of this so-called "time sheet"
(·submitted as -c-ounsel says two months after the aecident) does not indi-cate that the ten and one-half hours
therein referred to was for work on the da.te of the accident, to-wit: May 8, 1939, but indi0ates only that there
was due the applicant pay for ten and one-half hours
from" 5-7 to 5-13-39,'' undoubtedly the houf!s unpaid for
for tha·t period of six da.y.s, just as it is stated therein.
It is ·evident that.- the record d·nes not bear out the presumption, or rather, the pure ·conje-cture engaged in by
counsel, whtich if established as a fact rather than a mere
surmise would he wholly immate-rial to any issue involved
in 'this oas·e. We fail to s·ee how such an unexeeuted
receipt would in any wise· aid the case of the applicant,
even if it showed that on the day of the a,ccident he
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had received credit for ten and one-half hours work, or
even mo·re.
As p·ointed out in our opening brief, the accident to
the ~applicant happ·ened a.way fr:om the employer's premises, whoHy disconne-cted from his busine-ss, and at a
time when the employer had no control and dire-ction
over the applicant. At that time, :he was performing no
service for his employer and he was neither required nor
dire-cted to go home for his .supper nnr to use the employer's motor ;cycle for that purpose.
D~ef.end~ants

state in their brief that they do not
challenge the well-established ''going and coming rule.''
However, they ~seek to avoid its application to this ease
by reference t.o cases in which, .due to the pe-culiar facts
in ea~eh of them, such rule is not appli0able. In the cas-es
eited by defendants, the accident resulted from a. risk
or hazard which was n·eces.sa.rily or ordinarily or reasonably inherent or incident to the work of the employee,
which is· not the situation in the cruse at bar.
The case ·of Cud·a:hy Packing Company v. Ind. Com.,
60 ·ufa.h 161, 207 P. 148, is easily distinguishable from
the instant case. In that .case the employee, in order to
reach his pl,ace of employment, was obliged tn cross the
railroad tracks which bore so intimate a relation to the
packing ·company'(s premi~ses that it could hardly be
trea t.ed ias otJ'Lerwis.e than a.s a .part of the premises. The
court· said at page 170:
''Conceding that the w·eight of authority
denies to an employee the right to compensation
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for an injury received while on his \vay to or
from his employment, the question here, in its
final ~analysis, i's: Did the particular facts surrounding this accident make this case an exception to the holdings of the courts~''
·This ·court further said:
"It \Yas customary, in fact absolutely necessary, for employees going to the plant to work
to pass over and acrOIS'S these railroad tracks on
the public road where the accident happened. N·o
other means or· way existed by which employees
could get to the plant. * * * If there is lialbility for the injury under .consideration, it must
be founded upon the inferable fa;ct that the dHnger incident to crossing this railroad track, by
reason of its location and proximity to the packing plant, must be held to have been within the
contemplation of the parties at the date of the
employment.''
The case of Hobson v. Dept. of Labor and Industries,
(Wash.) 27 P. (2d) 1091, cited by defendants is likewise
an exception to the general rule and s-o not in point, as
i S clearly demonstrated by the following syllabus there·in:
1

''Death of watchman who wa!s on duty 24
hours daily and who was required to furnish his
own food, which wa.s caused wih.en speeder left
track on way hack from crossing where watchman
went for sup1ilies and mail, held eomp·ensable as
'arising in ·course of employment'.''
The court said at page 109 2:
1

''Hi1s ·contract of employment required him
to furnish his own fo,od supplies, and it was within
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the ·Contemplation of that ·Contract that he call
at the .crossing for such supplies. So, too, it was
one of his duties to .call at nhat erossing for mail.
The evidence i1s uncontradicted that he went to
the crossing for both purposes. * * * ·The
action of Hobson, procuring fnod supplies, was
ne~cess'ary to the proper per'formHnce of his work,
and ·constituted no interruption of the course of
the employm.ent (twenty-four hours' duty daily
as a wa:t·chman and genera l repairman). Rill v.
Department of Ltahor and Indu1stries, (Wash.)
24 P. (2d) 9'5. Hence, Hobson was engaged in the
furtheranee of the interests of his employer at
the time of the fatal accident.''
1

·Obviously H;obson was in the .course of his employment,_ .and this ease in no way as~sists in the determination
of the instant case.
The case -cited by defendan1Js of Chandler v. Ind.
Co~m., 55 Utalh 213, 184 P. 1020, sustains the position of
the plaintiffs rather than that of the defendants.
In that case the duties of the employee required him
to go from his ho,me each morning to the garage and get
his employer's delivery automobile, and drive it down
to his employer's place of business, and to use it througJ!out the day in making deliveries of m.eat and groceries,
·and return it tO' the garage at night after his day's work
was finished.

When he was unable to make all the de-

liveries of the day, he would bring with him to his ho1ne
sueh unde'livered packages and make delivery of them
on foot the following morning on his wa.y to the garage
to get the car.
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It ''Ta's alleged in the co~mplaint, .demurrer to whieh
was sustained by the district court, that \vhile Chandler
was ·on his way to the garage to get the automobile to
begin making deliveries required of him as aforesaid,
and while actually making delivery of mea.t for his employer \Yhieh \Yas undelivered the .evening before, he w~as
attacked and bitten by a dog, resulting in hydrophobia,
from which he died.
Inasmuch a.s it i•s p·erfeetly clear that Chandler was
performing ·a service for his ·employer at th.e time of
the accident, the injury aros-e out of and in the course
of his employment. Chandler's duties took and kept him
on the streets, a risk ne·cessarily incid·ent to his employment, whether in the automobile or on foot, so that he
us·ed the .streets in the regular course of his duties in
making deliveries, the very servi-ce for whi:cih. he was
employed.
In the Chand'ler .case the employee was performing
service for his ·employer. In the instant ease, Harris
was !on a mis·sion wholly his own.
D·ef.endants ·cite the· ease of Twin Peaks CGIJVYl,ing Co.

v. Ind. Com., 57 Utah 589, 196 P. 853. T.hat this case is
not in point is apparent from the· following quotation
from the ~syllabus therein, ~lhowing that when an employee remains on the premises during working h~ours
and moves about in an ina-ctive period within reasonable
limits, visiting with fellow employees, he does not leave
the -course of employment.
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''Where 15 year :old hoy entering a freight
elevator to return to his ;work from a. floor visited
during an interval of leisure was killed by the
movement of the elevator when he turned on the
pow.er, previous~y shut off by himself as a joke
on a ·Companion who was coming up and failed to
disengage the .swi·tch on tlhe ·eleY.ator when it
stopped between the floors, an a.ward under the
Workmen's c·nmpensation Act was justified on
the theory that the acident oc-curred 'in the cours·e
of employment'."
It is thus apparent from the foregoing that the a-ccident occurred on the premises of the employer during a
slack time, :but ·still within the working hours of the employee. Though the eourt held that the emplory·ee, a child
of hut fourteen years of age, had not departed from the
course of his employment be-cause of what he did on the
premises during .a sla·ck period, the court said:
"It is true that in some of its aspects this
may .be a borderline ca.se, and if the deceased
had been a man of mature years and expe-rience
. we might have reached a different -conclusion."
T!he actual age of the deceased was fourteen years,
ten months at the time of his death.
· The sweeping dictum referred to by the defendants
in that ease, and quoted by them in their brief was not
neces:sary to the de-cision of the ease. As counsel well
said, this is not a ''going and coming'' ease, and is therefore of no help to the. de-cision of the question befo-re the
court.
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The case of Utah ...4pex Mining Co. v. Ind. Com., 67
Utah 537, 248 P. 490, is not in point for the reason that
the protection of la \V extends tn a reasonable time and
space for the emp'loyee to go to or leave the lncality or
zone of his \York, and "~hile he i•s in proximity in approaching or leaving the place of his employment by the
only means of acc.es·s thereto. In this .case it is o:bvious
that the emplo~Tee was electrocuted on the premises of
the employer within that reasona'ble time extended to
employees to leave ·the zone of their work. No parallel
exists between the facts of that case and the case under
discussion.
\\. . hat the case of MacKay v. Department of La1bor
and Industries, (Wa·sh.) 44 P·. (2d) 793, cited by defendants has to do with the present ·Case is not clear. There
the ·employe-e at. the time of injury was performing a
service for his employ.er ne~essary and incident to his
employment. As stated by defenda.nt·s, he had taken
the broken parts of a .caterpillar to a. garage for repairs,
and while at the garage he was injured. The distin-etion
betw'een the MacKay case and this oase is that MacKay
was at a pla.ce where his employment required him to be,
and Harris, the app'licant herein, wa~s at a place of his
own choosing, where his employment did not r·equire
him to be.
Where an injury results to an employee .a.t a place
where the employm.ent neither required nor expected
him to go, or in a plaee where his employm·ent should not
take him, it ·Cannot be said to arise out of or in the course
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of the. employment. Therein lies the distinction between
the above case and the case at bar.
The case of Gilmore v. Ring Canst. Co., (Mo.) 61
S. W. (2d) 764, .cited by defe ndants is not in point for the
defendant·s, but rather clearly sustains plaintiffs' position, as is shown by the following e~cerpt from the opinion in that case:
1

"H·e (the applicant) was doing what his foreman t-old ·,him to do that is, to wait on the job for
development as to weather cO'nditions. Complainant was ·obeying his master',s orders. He was as
·much in his line of duty .as he would have been
if pouring -cement. Complainant wa·s waiting at
what may he inferred to be the a·ecustomed place,
that is, around the fire with other employees; on
this December morning. Being around· that fire
and waiting was incident to his employment and
·while so situa:te an accident occurred within the
m·e·aning set out in the act."
D:ef.endants cite the ease of Michaux, et a.Z., v. Gate
City Orawt.ge, etc., C·o., ('N. C.) 172 S. E. 406, wherein a
ne~ro hoy was injured while gett,ing on his employer's
truck. That case is nO't appli·cable for the reasons stated
in the opinion as follows :
''Moreover hi~s services were necessary to the
proper and efficient dist.ri;bution of the products
of the employer. He w.as injured in attempting
to climb upon the truck to which .he had been assigned in the prosecution of the .business of the
owner. * * * The faet that previous to his
injury he had heen playing ·or scuffling or sparring with another boy does not preclude re.covery
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upon the facts di·sclo·s-ed by the re.cord. Such facts
'bore no relation to his fall from the truck and the
consequent death.''
Defendants are in error when they state that the
court in the a~boYe case ''ignores the fa.ct that he had
left his employment for purposes of his own,'' because
it is apparent from the fa·c:ts that he wa·s an a·ssista.nt
to the truck driYer and th.erefoTe had to get on and off
the truck, and that his plaee of employment was on the
truck \Yhich he

"~as

getting· on at the time of his injury.

Counsel for defendants have overlooked the point
clearly recognized by the ·court that it \Yas not the s·cuffle
that caused the injury, but getting onto the truck, which
he had a right to do .and where he had a right to be.
Reference is made by defendants to the ·Case of Texas

Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 50 iS. W. (2d) 465, a Texas
cas-e. This case is distinguishable from the instant case
because the eompensation act in that state is much broader and n1ore inclusive than our·s, as is shown by the following excerpt from the opinion in that case :
'·'The Workmen's Compensation Law makes
·eompensable all injuries, with ex-ceptions not ne;ees·sary to now notice,' of every kind and charac:ter
having to do with and originating in the work,
business, trade or profession of the employer
re.ceived hy an employee while enga,ged in or about
the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer, whether upon the em·ployer's premises
or elsewhere. * * *' ''
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The holding in the a:bove case is justified only because ·of the foregoing language of the Texas statute.
The above ca.se is further distinguishable from the
case under consideration because of the peculiar facts
involved therein. The employee w.as away from ho,me
on a job. The eompany had no means of caring for its
employees in the location of the work, and the applicant
wa1s injured while in an effort to: se-cure a rooming place,
none having been provided at the ·Camp. Since the Tex'as
act makes .compensable all injuries originating in the
work, the court said that securing a necessary rooming
place was ineidental to and neee·ssary to his duty.
Reference is made by defendants to the case of Industrial Com. v. Murphy, ('Ohio) 197 N .. E. 505, invo'lving
an accident to an employee of an undertaker. That ca,se
is not applicable to the situation in the instant case, heeause there the employee wa.s, in effe-ct, on duty twentyfour hours a. day, just :as in the case of the watchman
cited by defendant·s, heTeinbef.ore referred to.

The

peculiar time and terms of employment of the undertaker's assistant are illustrated by the following quotation from the opinion in that case.
"It wa.s necess·ary that he should at every
mome;nt of the day and night keep his employer
aware of where he might he reached by telephone,
and it was a part of his contract of employment
that immediately upon reeeiving call he- should
repair at once to the funeral parlors ·Or ~such other
place as might he- de)signa,ted ;by his employer. It
is obvious that defendant in error had no regular
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hours of employrnent. * * * It seems clear
to us that there are rnany differen·c.es between the
ease under consideration and wha.t is .commonly
styled as 'coming~ and g~oing case' where the employee has a fixed time to appear a:t his employer's place of residence. Up to the time the employee reaches such plaee he is his own master,
can cho-ose his own route, en.gage in such private
e-nterprises as he sees fit, take as much time as
is consistent W'"ith reaching his place of employment in the stipulated time, start when and from
where he chooses, and, after he leaves his pla·ce
of ·employment, go where ih:e ple'ases, with no
responsibility to advise his employer of his movements. In the instant .ca,se it is perfe-ctly apparent
that immediate-ly upon reeeiving the telephone
-call it became the duty of the employee to go
directly to his place of employment a.s rapidly
and directly as he could. ' '
We have carefully read and reviHwed herein all of
the cases eited by the defendants on this issue and it
is obvious that none of them are applicable to the case
at bar.
In the re.cent case of Red Arrow· Bon.ded Messenger
Corp. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 103 P·. (2d) 1004, ·a :California
case, a messenger hoy, after delivering a message deviated from the dire:ct route to his employer's office by
going home to ge·t some food, and after eating started
back to the office and was injured en route. The court
said:
''The petitioner corn tends that the deviation to
procure .a meal having been unauthorized and
contrary to ins·truetions, it can not he held to have
been wi:thin the S·cope of his employment, and that
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the injuries did not arise out of or in the .course
of his employment. We are in aceord with th~
position taken by the petitioneT. * * * The
award is annulled.''
In the ·Case of Fidelity .a;nd Casualty Co. v. Ind. Ac'C.
Com., 19~2 P. 16.6, the 0ourt said at page 167:
''·The ques·tion for decision is tersely stated
hy counsel for petitione-r~s as follows: 'Should
.compens'ati~on be awarded to an employee who,
p.urely for his own purposes, leaves his place of
employment before his day's work is fini·shed
and, several hours later. is injured upon the public streek when returning to hi~s place of work~' ''
The eourt quoted from the leading ca,se of Ocean
Accident, etc., Co. v. Ind. Ace. Com., 173 Cal. 313, 159
P. 1041, and ·Concluded its opinion with the following
Htatement:
''The sole claimed purpose of his intended
return to the garage was for the performance of
duties .at that place, which weTe such duties a·s
were ordinarily performed by him when on duty
a~t the gara1ge. -The ·Conclusion ne-cessarily follows that the employee's injuries were not rereeived at a time w;hen he wa.s performing service
for his employer or .acting within the course of
his employment.
''The award is annulled.''
In the- .case of Cal. Cas. Ind. Ex. v. Ind. Ace. Com.,
213 P. 257, it appeared that the driveT of a truck was.
killed while eros sing the s treet after hav:ing obtained
lunch in a place wh·ere his duties did not call him, the
1
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employer permitting him to take his lune:h ·"r,here and
·when he desired. The court said at page 258 :
'·'In the very broadest sense, of eourse, it is
true that the injury to the decedent grew out of
and \Yas incidental to his employment, since it
\vas necessarY that he should return fr-om the
place where he lunched to the truck. The right
to an a.\Yard is not alone founded upon the fact
that such is the case, but upon the fa·et that the
service the employee is rendering ·at the time of
the injury grows out of and is incidenl1al to the
en1ploynzeut. F:or instanc.e, it is the rule that an
employee going to and from his place of employment is not rendering any serviee, and hegins to
render such service only vvhen he arrives at the
place of h~s employment, and proceeds to use
some instrumentality provided, by means of which
he immediately places himself in a position to
perform his task. Ocean A!ccident, et·e., Co. v.
Ind. Ace. Comm., 173 Cal. 313, 32;2, 159 P. 1041,
L. R. A. 1917B 336. It was not intended bv the
Compensation A·ct that the employer who ~omes
within its provisions shall be the insurer of his
employee at all times during the period of his
employment.''
1

The court in that case then quoted with approval
the following language from the case of In re Betts, 118
N. E. 5·51:
''We understand that all of these cas'es reeognize and in ~ffect hold that: 'It is not enough for
the applicant to ~say, "The accident would not
have happened if I had not been engage~d in that
e·mployment, or if I ha.d not been at that particular place.'' He must go further and must say,
''The accident arose because of something I was
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doing in the course of my employment, or because
I was exposed by the nature of my employment
to some particular danger.'' ' ''

In answer to what was said in our opening brief with
respect to there being no evidence whatever in the record
of any permanent injury to the applicant, the defendants
refer to the report of Dr. C. L. Shields, attending physician, ·of date ·May 18, 193~9, ( tr. 3) which, made out on the
regular surgieal report blank of the Industrial c·ommission, de·scrihes only the injuries and the tre·a tment given,
and which, in reply to the item No. 6 thereon, "Will any
permanent injury or deformity resulf~ If so, to what
extent~'' is followed by a question mark. Certainly this
report, together with the fact that the applicant appeared
in pers-on before the Commission as counsel says, does
not afford any evidence whatsoever, much les·s the required substantial evidence, of any permanent injury.
The· attending physician did not testify, and there is no
hasis whatever for the gratuitous :finding that the applicant ''now suffers some .permanent partial loss of the
use of hi·s left leg below the knee.''
''An a~ward must he based upon evidence
which fairly proves the extent or per·centage of
disability; and where a preponderance ·Of the evidence shows that the disability was not to the
extent for whireh the award was granted, it must
·be reversed. Bh~,sicians' opinions are ordinarily
of great weight in de termining an injured employee 's physical {}Ondition, and where the injury
1
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or disability is of a character requiring professional skill to determine the extent thereof, the
question must necessarily he determined by the
testin1ony of expert medical \Yitnesses. On the
issue of the permanence of the di,sa'bility, the evidence on \Yhich the .c:onclusion is based that it
\Yas permanent should not he a mere conje.c:ture
or surmise, but the conclusion should be a legitinlate ·One from .competent eVlidence, although doubt
-as to the date of the employee's recovery will be
resolved in his favor. Further an a\vard for
permanent total disability must be based on ·competent evidence, and cannot rest on conje-cture or
surmise, and the testimony must he such as to
support the legitimate con.clusion of such disa·bility."
71 C. J. 1132.

'' T,he award or judgment in compensation
proceedrings must ·Conform to the evidence and be
based on it; and an award made on a finding that
i~s not sustained by the evidence is contrary to
law·.''
71 C. J. 1188.

vVe pref,a·ced our remarks herein with reference to
the f-act that the de-cision herein, if logically carried out
would render the empl·oyer liable to third persons, with
a statement that ''driscussion of the above point, while
not strictly pertinent to the ·c,ase at har, is vital because
an incorrect decision of the instant case'' would produce
absurd results. We did not ask this ·court for any ruling
in advance on such a question, as counsel would interprc\t our remarks, but ·merely pointed out the incongruity
of such a s~ituation. Therefore defendants' comment
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upon the ''moot case'' is wholly foreign to the ISsue
herein.

In conclusion it is earnestly urged that the Industrial Commis·sion erred in its .c-onclusion as to the legal
effect of the undisputed evidence in this case, and that
it should have followed the law establi·shed by this Court
in the ease of Fidelity Q.asualty C ompavny v. Commis·sion.,
79 Utah 189, 8 P. (2d) 617, and therefore the award
herein of the Industrial ·C-ommission should be annulled
and set aside·.
Respe.ctfully submitted,
ELIAS

L.

DAY,

CHARLES WELCH, JR.

E. MoRETON,
Attorneys for PlaWntiffs.
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